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INTRODUCTION
A. General
Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the United Nations,
described the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters' as the "most ambitious venture in the
area of 'environmental democracy' so far undertaken under the
auspices of the United Nations."2 Yet few outside the circle of
European environmental law enthusiasts have any knowledge of
this Convention. Given its major importance particularly as
regards access to justice, the Convention deserves far wider
attention, not least because it may have implications for
European and national law outside the environmental field.
Since the last few years have seen a raft of crucial legal
developments within the EU in relation to the Convention, the
time is ripe for an article on this topic for mainstream European
lawyers.
Two other factors make this subject an irresistible choice
for an article in this issue of the Fordham International Law
journal. First, Judge Schiemann made his name at the English
Bar as a planning and environmental lawyer and later sat on a
number of significant cases decided by the Court of Justice on
the Convention. Second, this author has devoted most of the
past four years to the Convention, and is thus well placed to
discuss the recent developments in this field.

1. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, May 17, 2005, 2005 O.J.
L 124/4 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention] (displaying the text of the Convention); see
also Public Participation, EnvironmentalPolic. UNITE) NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION
FOR EUROPE (Mar. 28, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://live.untce.org/cnv/pp/welcome.htmi
(describing the Aarhus Convention).
2.

ECON. COMM'N FOR EUR., THE AARH-US CONVENTION: AN IMPLEMENTATION

GUIDE, at v, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72, U.N. Sales No. E.00.I1.E.3 (2000) (addressing the
"global" significance of the Aarhus Convention) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE], available at http://wwW.unece.org/index.php'id=21437. The second edition
which

daLts

fron

April

http:/vw/Nkunece.org/index.php-id=32764

2013

may

be

viewed

at
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The Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the
UN Economic Commission for Europe. Hence its three official
languages: English, French and Russian. It was signed in
Denmark's second city in 1998 and came into force in 2001. The
European Union concluded the Convention by Council
Decision 2005/370. When doing so, it did not enter any
reservations but, as specifically required by Article 19(5) of the
Convention, it did make a detailed declaration as to the extent
of its own powers with regard to matters governed by the
Convention. 4
Moreover, all the Member States are also parties to the
Convention. The last of the current Member State to ratify were
Croatia6 and Germany (2007) and Ireland (2012). No less than
20 other countries - including three in the Caucasus and four in
Central Asia, but excluding Russia and Switzerland - have also
chosen to be bound by the Convention. The westernmost
Contracting Party is Iceland, while the easternmost is
Kazakhstan.
Article 1 of the Convention provides: "In order to
contribute to the protection of the right of every person of
present and future generations to live in

an environment

adequate to his or her health and well-being, each Party shall
guarantee the rights of access to information, public

3. See 2005 0.J. L 124/1 art. 1 [hercinafter Council Approval of Convention]
(approving the Convention on Access to Information on behalf of the Community),
available
at
http://cur-lex.curopa.u /LexUriSciv/
LexUriSci,.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:124:0001:0003:EN:PDF. Article 17 of the Convention
expressly provides that it was open for signature by "regional economic integration
organizations constituted by sovereign States' members of the Econonic Commission
for Europe to which their member States have transferred competence over nattcrs
governed by this Convention, including the competence to enter into treaties in
respect of these nattCs." Aarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 17.
4. Council Approval of Convention, supra note 3, at Annex Aarhus Convention.
supra note 1, art. 19(5) ("In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, the regional economic integration organisations ... shall declare the extent
of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Convention.").
5. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 4(2)(e) TFEU has
made it plain that environinental policy is a competence shared bctween the EU and
the Member States. However, that provision merely confirmed the pre-existing
situation. See Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 4(2) (e), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 51.
6. Croatia acceded to the EU on July 1 2013; see the Treaty of Accession (2012
O.J. L 112/10).
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participation

in decision-making,

and access to justice in

environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this

Convention."
As is plain from the title of the Convention and Article 1,
the Convention consists of three "pillars": access to information
(Articles 4 and 5); the participation of the public in the
decision-making process (Articles 6 to 8); and access to justice
(Article 9). As regards the first pillar, the draftsmen of the
Convention drew heavily on Council Directive 90/313 on the
freedom of access to information on the environment;7 but,
since the first pillar went beyond that Directive, the Union
replaced it by Directive 2003/4 of the European Parliament and
the Council on public access to environmental information,
prior to ratifying the Convention.8 Similarly, the Directive on
environmental impact assessment ("the EIA Directive")9 was the
model for the second pillar.
This paper relates only to the implementation and the
application of the Convention within the scope of the EU
Treaties; what the Member States do in other fields will not be
considered. At all events, the three pillars will now be examined
in turn, concentrating on recent developments. The second
pillar will only receive very brief coverage, precisely because the
key developments in that field occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
Throughout this article, particular focus will be given to the case

7. See Council Directive 90/313/EEC on Freedom of Access to Information on the
Environment, 1990 0.J. L 158/56.
8 . See Council Directive 2003/4/E( on Public Access to Environmental
Information and Repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC, 2003 O.J. L 41/26
[hereinafter Environmental Information Directive]. As we shall see, the first pillar was
implemented, as regards the Union's own institutions and bodies, by Articles 3 to 8 of
Regulation 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council on the application
of the Aarhus Convention to Union institutions and bodics. See Council Regulation No.
1367/2006 on the Application of the Provisions of the Aarhus Convention, arts. 3-8,
2006 O.J. L 264/13 [hereinafter the Aarhus Regulation].
9. Council Directive 85/337/EE( on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain
Public and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. L 175/40, as amended
[hereinafter the EIA Directive]. That Directive has now been replaced by Directive
2011/92 of the European Parliament and the Council (2012 OJ. L 26/1), a
consolidating measure; and the Commission has recently issued a proposal for the
amendment of the latter instrument. See Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of
the Effects of CrLtain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, COM (2012)
628 Final (Oct. 2012).
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law of the Court of Justice, not only for the reasons set out
above: since the Union accounts for twenty-eight of the forty-six
Contracting Parties to the Convention, the Court's judgments
inevitably carry particular weight. This again shows the
particularly close link between the Convention and Union law.
At all events, another source of interpretation is the Aarhus
Convention Compliance Committee. 10 Accordingly, the
penultimate section will contain a succinct overview of the work
of that body in so far as it concerns the European Union. The
final section is the conclusion.''
Before considering any of these matters, however, we must
turn our attention to two preliminary issues: the key definitions
enshrined in the Convention; and the scope of EU
environmental law.
B. Definitions
In the main, the Convention applies only to acts of "public
authorities," a term defined in Aiticle 2(2) in terms which are
10. In addition, the non-binding Aarhus Convention Implementation Guide is
frequently of assistance. Supra note 2. However. the Court noted that this guide is not
always reliable; and in the same case, Advocate General ("AG") Sharpston, pointed out
that the guide lacks authoritative status. Flachgglas Torgau GmbH v. Federal Republic of
Germany, Case C-204/09. [2012] E.C.R. I_
35-36 (delivered Feb 14 2012) (not
yet published); Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Flackgias Torgau GmbH, [2012]
E.C.R.
, 1 58 (delivered June 22, 2011). In any case, this guide was drafted in 2000
and is therefore outdated. While the new edition of the Implementation Guide (supra,
note 2) is a notable improvement on the first, the same caveat applies.
11. The Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers to the UNECE
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Fnvironmental Matters will not be considered in this article. 2006
O.J. L 32/56. available at http://wyw.unece.org/fileadminii/ DAM/env/pp/prtr/
Protocol%20text /PRTR Protocol c.pdf. The Union is a party to this protocol, but
some Member States are not. Council Decision 2006/61 on the conclusion, on behalf
of the European Community, of the UN-ECE Protocol on Pollutant Release and
Transfer Registers, 2006 O.J. L 32/54; see Council Regulation No. 166/2006 concerning
the establishment of a European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, 2006 (.). L
33/1.
The amendment to the Convention adopted by Decision 11/1 of the Meeting of
the Parties is not yet in force. See United Nations Meeting of the parties to the
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making, and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Report of the Second Meeting of the
Parties, May 25-27, 2005, Decision II/1 Genetically Mdifed Organisms, U.N. Doc.
2005),
available at
Add.
1
(Junc
20
E(E/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.2,
http: //www.unce.org/fileadmiiii /DAM/ cnv/ docum entLs/2005 /pp/ cc
ece.mp.pp.2005.2.add.2.e.pdf.
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broad but expressly exclude "bodies or institutions acting in a
judicial or legislative capacity." This language was taken with a
minor modification from Article 2(b) of Council Directive
90/313,12 which was a source of inspiration for the first pillar of
the Convention. Moreover, as the Court noted in Flachglas
Torgau,1 this rule is rooted, insofar as bodies acting in their
legislative capacity are concerned, in the provision in the EIA
Directive which is now Article 1(4) of Directive 2011/92.
According to that provision, that Directive does not apply to
"projects the details of which are adopted by a specific act of
national legislation, since the objectives of this Directive,
including that of supplying information, are achieved through
the legislative process. "14
However, only one provision in the Convention sheds any
light on what is meant by "acting in a legislative capacity": the
first paragraph of Article 8, which requires the Contracting
Parties to "strive to promote effective public participation . . .
during the preparation by public authorities of executive
regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules
that may have a significant effect on the environment."
Although this is merely a best endeavours clause, its impact on
the scope of the Convention is plain: this provision leaves no
room for the suggestion that all acts of general application are
to be regarded as "legislative" for the purposes of the
Convention.
In Flachglas Torgau, the Court of Justice was in effect called
upon by Germany's highest administrative court to decide

12. See Council Directive on Freedom of Access to Information on the
Environment, supra note 8, 1990 O.J. L 158 art. 2b. at 57.
13. SeeFlachgias Torgan GmbH, [2012] E.C.R. 1_,
[ 44 (delivered Feb 14, 2012).
14. This provision was to be found in Artidce 1(5) of the original EIA Directive,
and is now to be found in Artide 1(4) of Direcive 2011/92. Directive 2011/92 on the
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment,
2012 O.J. L 26/1, arts. 1(4), at 3. Where a parliament merely rubber-stamps a Bill
without any proper transparency or debate, the exception in Article 1(4) does not
(delivered Oct.
apply. See Boxi v. Walloon Region, Case C-128/09, [2011] E.C.R. I
18, 2011, Grand Chamber) (not yet published) (Belgium); Solvay v. Walloon Region,
Case C-182/10. E.C.R. I
(delivered Feb. 16, 2012) (not yet published) (Belgium).
On the case law of the Belgian Constitutional Court on access tojustice under Article 9
of the Convention, see Bombois "La jurisprudence de la (our constitutionnelle relative
SFariticle 9 de la Convenitioln d'Aarhus garantissant 1acces

a la justice enl iatire

environnernentale" 2013/2 Amenagernent et Environnement 61.
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whether the federal Government of that Member State had
"acted in a legislative capacity" when it wrote internal
memoranda, issued legal opinions and corresponded with the
federal environmental authority on the legislative Bill which it
had proposed and which became the federal Law on
greenhouse gas emissions. The plaintiff company sought access
to these documents pursuant to Article 4 of the Aarhus
Convention and Directive 2003/4.1 Since the Bill in question
was destined to become primary legislation, there was no doubt
that it was "legislative" in nature for the purposes of Article 2(2);
but it did not necessarily follow that the federal executive was
"acting in a legislative capacity." The Court recognised that
Article 2(2) excludes bodies or institutions acting in a legislative
capacity, whether or not they are legislative bodies. Accordingly,
the Court held that a Member State was entitled to withhold
such documents pursuant to Article 2(2), albeit only up to the
end of the legislative process.'1
The sequel is Deutsche Umwelthilfe v. Federal Republic of
Germany,17 in which the Court is in effect asked to decide
whether the German federal Government was acting in "a
legislative capacity" when it conducted correspondence with the
motor industry about a proposed regulation amending the
15. See Environmental Information Directive, sapra note 8. When adopting this
Directive, the Union exercised its right under Article 3(5) of the Convention to go
beyond the requirements of the Convention. For instance, the final subparagraph of
Article 2(2) of the Directive leaves it to the Member States to decide whether to
exclude bodies or institutions acting in a legislative capacity fron the definition of
public authoritics." See id. at 28.
16. In the absence of any provision on the temporal scope of this protection in
either the Convention or Directive 2003/4. the Court reached this conclusion on the
basis of the objectives of the provisions in question. In paragraph 69 of her Opinion in
the sane case, in which she reached the sane conclusion, AG Sharpston drew an
analogy with Case C-528/07P API v Commission [2010] E.C.R. I-8533; there. it, was held
that divulging written pleadings in court proceedings would no longer undermine the
protection of such proceedings for the purposes of Article 4(2) of Regulation
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliaicnt. Council and Commission documents (2001 O.J.

L 145/43), once those court proceedings had been closed. Opinion of Advocate
General Sharpston, Flachglas Torgau GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case C204/09. [2012] E.C.R. I_
169 (delivered June 22, 2011) (not yet published).
17. Deutsche Umwelthille eV v. Bundesrepublik Deutchland, Case C-515/l11
(pending
case),
available
at
http: //cria.curopa.cujuris/document/
document.jsf?tcx[=&docid135468&pagclndex=0&doclang=EN&imodc=1st&dir=&occ-f

irst&part= l&cid= 1 146472.
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legislation on the energy consumption labelling of cars. This
case differs markedly from Flachglas Torgan which concerned
correspondence between the executive and other public
authorities; and it also remains to be seen whether an act such as
the German regulation in issue may be regarded as "legislative"
for the purposes of the Convention and Directive 2003/4,
whatever its status in domestic law.
In her Opinion, Advocate General Sharpston took the view
that "an executive body is exctded from the exception in the
first sentence of Article 2(2) of that directive when adopting
regulatory instruments pursuant to enabling powers contained

in a legal rule of' a higher rank, unless the procedure for
adopting such instruments guarantees a. right of access to
environmental information in such a way that the objectives of

Directive 2003/4 have been achieved in a way comiparable to
that provided b y the procedure for adopting legislative acts. The
burden of demnonstrating that that is so lies with the executive

body seeking to rely upon that exception. It is for the national

court to verify that the objectives of Directive 2003/4 have been
satisfied, taking account in particular of the ojectives of

transparency and public scrutiny,"

1

In any case, the better view is that bodies and institutions
"acting in ajudicial or legislative capacity" fall outside the scope
of the Convention for all purposes."' Having said that, among
the matters defined in Article 2(3) (b) as constituting
"environmental information" is "legislation . . . affecting or
likely to affect the elements of the environment." o It is not
Id. at para. 71.
19. In Flachglas Torgau, the plaintiff in the main case contended that Article 8 of
the

Convention constituted an

exception to

the rule in Article 2(2)

excluding

authorities acting in their legislative capacity, and thus applied to the preparation of
legislative proposals. The Court dismissed this argument on the grounds that Ar ticle 8
is not expressed to apply to draft laws." [2012] E.C.R. 1,
1 35ff (delivered Feb 14.
2012).
20. SeeAarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(3) (b), at 5-6. The definition covers
information relating to (a) the "elements of the environment" (e.g. air, water, soil.
biodiversity), (b) "factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities
of measures, including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies,
legislation . . . affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment" and (c)
factors such as "the state of health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites
and built structures, inasnuch as they are or may be affected by the state of elements of
the environment or, through these elements, by the factors. activities or measures

referred to in subparagraph (b) above." Id.
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obvious how the apparent contradiction between this provision
and the exclusion of authorities "acting in a legislative capacity"
from the definition of "public authorities" can be resolved.
Turning to the words "environment" and "environmental",
it is anomalous that these terms are not defined, even though
they are crucial to an understanding of the scope of the
Convention. However, the definition of "environmental
information" in Article 2(3) indicates that this is a broad
concept. 21
The concepts of "the public" and "the public concerned"
are especially important; they are defined in Aiticle 2(4) and (5)
respectively."2 The crucial point here is that environmental nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are deemed to be part of
the public concerned, so long as they meet "any requirements
under national law." Since breaches of environmental law are

frequently of concern to the population as a whole without any
particular persons being singled out, it is frequently very
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce environmental law in
judicial proceedings on the basis of the traditional rules of locus
standi. In other words, the "environment has no voice of its
own."2 The purpose of this reform, which is arguably the
greatest innovation introduced by the Convention, is to

21.

See supra note 20 and accompanying

text (discussing the confines of the

Convention's definition of -environmental information").
As discussed below, oversimplifying somewhat, human health is "environmental"
where it is or may be affected by the "clements of the environment." Stichting Natuur
en Milieu v. College voor de toelating van gewasbeschermingsmiddelen en biociden,
Case C-266/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1-6191. 1 47.
22. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(4)-(5), at 6. The first of these
terms means "one or more natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national
legislation or practice, their associations. organisations or groups." Id., art. 2(4), at 6.
The "public concerned" means: "the public affected or likely to be affected by, or
having an interest in, the environmental decision-making; for the purposes of this
definition, non-governinintal organizations promoting environmental protection and
meeting any requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest." Id.,
art. 2(5), at 6. These definitions are to be read with Article 3(9) according to which the
rights enshrined in the Convention are to be exercised "without discrimination as to
citizenship, nationality or doinicile and, in the case of a legal person. without
discrimination as to where it has its registered seat or an effective centre of its
activities." Id., art. 3(9), at 6.
23. Ludwig Kiiner, The Environmental Complaint in the E, 6 J. ELR. ENvT'L &
PTANNING L. 13, 25 (2009).
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surmount this obstacle by granting such NGOs to bring certain
judicial proceedings "on behalf of' the environment.
A nice question which appears to have received little or no
attention is to what extent, if at all, public authorities may
qualify as part of "the public" or "the public concerned."
Although the definitions of "the public" and the "public
concerned" in Article 2(4) and (5) are broad enough to include
public authorities, the purpose of the Convention is essentially
to confer rights on private parties and obligations on public
authorities.24 Having said that, local and regional authorities
frequently take action in the interests of their residents and in so
doing promote environmental protection.25 For this reason, it is
not necessarily helpful to have regard to the case law on Article
34 of the European Convention on Human Rights, according to
which "any person, non-governmental organisation or group of
individuals" may commence proceedings before the European
Court of Human Rights. That Court has interpreted these terms
so as to exclude "governmental organisations," namely public
authorities, including those which are autonomous of central
government such as local and regional authorities.2
C. The Scope oJEU EnvironmentalLaw
As the reader will be aware, this article is only concerned
with the Aarhus Convention insofar as it falls within the scope of
Union law. But what is that scope? That question cannot be
examined exhaustively here, but some assistance may be derived
from the declaration issued by the Union at the time of

24. Ai ticle 9(3) of the Convention is an exception since it provides for rights of
action against private persons as well as public authorities.
25. Gincinde Altrip (Municipality of Altrip) v. Rhincland-Palatinatc is a case in
point. Case C-72/12 (pending case).
"Radio France and Others v. France, 2004-II Eur. CA. H.R. at 1 81 (2004). The idea
behind this principle is "to prevent a Contracting Party acting as both an applicant and
a respondent party before the Court." Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v.
Turkey, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1 81 (2007). In any case, the wording of Article 34
ECHR is differint from the definition of "the public" in the Aarhus Convention. See
also Bank Mellat v. Council. Case T-496/10, [2013] E.C.R. I
, 1 36ff (judgment of

Jan.

29, 2013) (not yet published) (decliinig to follow the approach of the Strasbourg

Court).
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concluding the Convention on the extent of its powers in
relation to the matters covered by it.2
Mention must also be made of the landmark judgment in
the Slovakian bears case,28 where an environmental NGO had
sought to contest in the national courts the grant by the
Slovakian government of licences to hunt brown bears. This
prompted the national court to pose three questions for a
preliminary ruling on Article 9 of the Convention, a provision
which we shall examine when we consider the third pillar. The
Court held that, since the species is protected under the
Habitats Directive,29 the case fell within the scope of EU law.30
FIRST PILLAR: ACCESS TO INFORMATION
A. General
Ensuring the highest possible degree of transparency is a
key aim of the Convention, as is plainly shown by several recitals
in its preamble. The importance of transparency for enabling
private parties to exercise their rights under the second and
third pillars and to hold public authorities legally or politically
to account can scarcely be exaggerated.31
27. See generall, Council Approval of Convention, supra note 3, at Annex.
28. Lesoochranarske zoskupenie VL K v. Ministerstvo (Slovakian Bears), Case C240/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-1255. 1 2.
29. Council Directive 92/43/EE( on The Conservation of Natural Habitats and of
Wild Fauna and Flora, 1992 (.). 1, 206/7, arts. 12, 16 (read with Annex IV(a) thereto).
30. Slovakian Bears, [2011] E.C.R. 1-1255. 1132-38: see ). Simon case note, Europe
Mai 2011 Commentaries no 5 p. 9-11: see also Marcus Klaineit, Dark Matter- Competence,
Jurisdiction and "the Area Largely Covered by EULaw": Commenrt on Lesoochrandrske, 37 E. L
REV. 340, 344 (2012); Christophe Hillion and Panos Koutrakos eds., MIXED
A(,REEMENTS REVISITED - THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD (2010).
31. In extreme cases, the European Court of Human Rights has found that a
failure by a State to inform the public about the danger posed by a factory or plant was
a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which relatcs to
the right to privacy, family life and the home. Guerra v. Italy, 116/ 1996/735/932,
(1998. Eur. CL. H.R.): see Tatar v. Rounania. 67021/01 [2009]; NICHOLAS DE SADE1EER,
COMMLNTAIRE MEGRET ENVIRONNLMLNT ET MARCHE INERIIEUR 108-09

(3rd

ed.,

Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 2010); Ole W. Pedersen, The Ties that Bind: the
Environment, the European Convention on Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 2010 16(4)
EUR. PUB. L. 571, 575-76 (2010). Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
Union corresponds to Article 8 ECHR (see the Fxplanations on Article 7 2007
C303/20) and is therefore to be given the same meaning and scope, although it may go
beyond AtLicle 8 ECHR. See Charter of the Fundamental Rights of tie European Union
art. 52(3), 2010 0.J. C 83/389, at 402. However, in view of their general language,
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This pillar is governed by Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the
Convention. Article 4(1) requires "public authorities" to make
available to "the public" copies of documentation held by or for
them containing any "environmental information" requested.Y
According to the same provision, the applicant need not state
any particular interest; the same rule applies under Regulation
1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council
regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and
Commission documents, by virtue of Aiticle 6(1) of that
Regulation.3 Article 4(3) and (4) sets out a series of exceptional
cases in which a request for environmental information may be
refused; there is never any obligation to refuse such a request.
To a considerable extent, these exceptions match those
enshrined in Article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001.
According to Article 4(4) (d) of the Convention, a national
authority may decline a request for environmental information
if disclosure would adversely affect "the confidentiality of
commercial
and
industrial
information,
where
such
confidentiality is protected by law in order to protect a
legitimate economic interest." However, the same provision
then qualifies this exception to the right of access to
information, in the following sentence which reads: "Within this
framework, information on emissions which is relevant for the
protection of the environment shall be disclosed." For ease of
reference, this will be dubbed the "emissions rule."
On this point, the non-binding Aarhus Convention
Implementation Guide 34 provides helpful guidance when it
states that the word "emissions" is to be understood as emissions
within the meaning of Article 3(4) of the Industrial Emissions
reliance on the ECHR and the Charter can usually be expected to lead to less
satisfactory results than thC Aarhus Convention and the EU legislation considered in
the present article. See general Nicholas De Sadeicer Enforcing EUCHR Principles and
FandamentalRights in Envionmental Cases, 2012 NORDICJ. INT'l L. 39.
32 .See Aarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(3)(b), at 5-6 (defining
environmental information" as defined in Article 2(3)). See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
33. See supra note 16, and accompanying text.. In 2008, the Commission made a
proposal for an aniendnent to this Regulation (COM (2008) 229 Final (April 2008)),
which it subsequently revised following protracted negotiations with the European
Parliament and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (COM (2011) 137 Final
(March 2011). NegotiaLions continue.
34. See IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, supra note 2, at 83.

2013]

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

1435

Directive");" that Directive only covers emissions from factories
and other industrial installations, not from products. This
reading of the emissions rule makes good sense: since every
product is bound to emit chemical substances at some stage of
its life-cycle, the protection of business secrets provided for in
Article 4(4) (d) would be wholly undermined if "emissions" were
taken to include emissions from products. We shall return to
this issue shortly.
Article 5, which relates to the collection and dissemination
of environmental information by public authorities, need not
detain us here.
The implementation of the first pillar by the Union with
regard to information held by or for the Member States must be
considered separately from the implementation with respect to
information in the possession of the Union's own institutions
and bodies, since different provisions apply. As we shall see, in
both cases, the Union has made ample use of the possibility set
out in Article 3(5) of the Convention for Contracting Parties to
grant broader access to information than is required by the
Convention.
B. Information Held by orforMember States
As already mentioned, access to environmental information
is now governed by Directive 2003/4. This instrument is
supplemented by a host of provisions relating to different
specific sectors, which cannot be considered here.6 Attention
35. ,Directive 2010/75 of the European Parliament and the Council on industrial
emissions (2010 OJ 1L334/17). This instrument replaces the Council Directive
2008/1/E concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, 2008 O.J. L 24/8
(replacing 1996 0.1. L 257/26) [hereinafter IPPC Directive].
36. The Court has accepted that Directive 2003/4 is not the only Directive by
which the Union legislator had implemented the first pillar of the Convention:
Commune de Sausheim v. Azelvandre, Case C-552/07, [2009] FCR. I-987, [ 52
(concerning Directive 2001/18/E( of the European Parliament and of Council on the
deliberate relcase into the environment of genetically modified organisns, 2001 OJ. L
106/1 art. 25); see Ville de Iyon v. Caisse des Depots et Consignations, Case C-524/09,
[2010] E.C.R. 1-14115 (employing Directive 2003/87/E( of the European Parliament
and the Council on greenhouse gas cmissions trading, 2003 O.J. L 275/32 art. 19). A
plethora of other provisions are scattered amongst a number of Directives.
See Directive 1107/2009/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the
placing of plant protection products on the market, 2009 O.J. L 309/1 art. 63; Directive
2012/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the control of major-
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should be drawn to the unique or almost unique nature of these
provisions: outside the environmental field, there is a dearth of

legislation requiring the Member States to divulge information
or documents - in stark contrast to the obligation imposed on
the institutions of the Union by Regulation 1049/2001 and
reinforced by Article 15(3) TEU and Article 42 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the Union. 3 7
A definition of "environmental information" is set out in
Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/4. This definition is even more
lengthy and detailed than that in Article 2(3) of the
Convention 8 on which it is of course based and which itself is
very broad.
Some light was shed on the meaning of this term by the
ruling in Stichting Natuur en Mlilieu. The case related to a
request from an environmental NGO for access to studies
consisting of field trials on residues of a particular plant
protection product ("PPP") on lettuce. This data had been
submitted by a subsidiary of the Bayer group to the Dutch
authorities with a view to their amending the maximum
permissible residue for the PPP. The subsidiary maintained that
these

documents

did

not

fall

within

the

concept

of

"environmental information." This argument was dismissed by
the Court on the basis that the studies were carried out as part
of a procedure for obtaining an authorisation of the PPP, the
purpose of that procedure being precisely to prevent risks and
hazards for humans, animals and the environment. The Court
held that the documentation sought contained environmental
information since this information "aims, by making it possible
to verify the level at which the MRL was set, to limit the risk that
accident hazards

involving dangerous

substances,

2012 O.J.

L

197/1

art. 22

[hereinafter Seveso III Directive]; see also EU ROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORT FROM THE
COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE ELROPLAN PARLIAMENT ON THE EXPERIENCE
GAINED IN THE APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2003/4/EC On Public Access to

Environmental Information, COM (2012) 774 Final, Information 774, 1 9 (Dec. 2012).
37. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 42, 2007 0.J. C
303/1, at 11.
38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the confines of the
Convention's definition of "environiental information").

39. Case C-266/09, [2010] E.C.R. 1-6191; seesupranote 21 and accompanying text
(referring to StichtingNatur en Milieu in support of the proposition that human health
is

"environient"

environment").

where

it

is or

may

be

affected

by

the

"clements

of the
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a component of biological diversity will be affected and the risk
that those residues will be dispersed in particular in soil or
groundwater . . ."40 The Court emphasised that information
relating to human health is "environmental information" only
so long as it relates to, or may be affected by, the elements of the
environment or factors or activities affecting or likely to affect
those elements.4 1
Article 4 of the Directive sets out a series of circumstances
in which a request for information "may" be refused, which
corresponds to that in Article 4 of the Convention. However, a
number of the exceptions set out in Article 4(2) of the Directive
such as the protection of personal data and intellectual property
relate to fundamental rights protected by the Charta (in casu
Articles 8 and 17(2) thereof). Accordingly, there are strong
grounds for thinking that, where the need to protect such
interests clearly outweighs the public interest in divulging the
information concerned, the public authorities are compelled to
withhold such information. If so, then the word "may" in Article
4(2) of the Directive is to be understood to mean "must" in
those instances.
The time has come to return to the "emissions rule." As we
noticed earlier, it is important to construe this rule narrowly if
the protection of business secrets provided for in Article 4(4) (d)
of the Convention is not to be wholly undermined. Within the
Union, three further considerations arise:
First, account must be taken of the ruling in Interseroh,
where the Court appeared to suggest that the protection of
business secrets is covered by Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the
Charter.4 2 While those provisions are subject to the general

40. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, StichtingNatuaren Milieu, [2010] E.C.R.
1-6191, 1 42.
41. Id. [40.
42. Interseroh Scrap and Metals Trading GinbH v. Sonderabfall-ManagementGesellschaft. Case C-1/11, [2012] E.C.R. 1,
1[ 43 (not yet published). Of these three
articles of the Charter, Article 16, which relates to the freedom to conduct a business,
appears to be the most relevant. See generally. Peter Oliver, What Purpose does Article 16 of
the Charter Serve? in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW

(Kuwver, forthcoming). Article 17 is applicable in so far as business secrets are to be
regarded as property; for the purposes of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") (1994 OJ L336/214), certain business secrets
are treated as intellectual property (see Articles 1(2) and 39 of that Agreement). In
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exception in Article 52(1), it is self-evident that this exception
cannot be applied without good reason.
Second, the Union legislator has exercised its right under
Article 3(5) of the Convention to adopt more stringent
provisions than those enshrined in the Convention: the second
subparagraph of Article 4(2) of Directive 2003/4 applies the
emissions rule to a number of the exceptions to the right of
access set out in the first subparagraph such as the
confidentiality of the personal data of natural persons, quite
apart from the protection of commercial and industrial secrets.
Article 8 of the Charter protects the personal data of natural
persons.
Third, the Union is a party to the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), 4 3
Article 39(3) of which provides for the protection of data
submitted with a view to obtaining market authorisation of
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemicals products in certain
circumstances. Although the scope of the latter provision is
rather limited, it must still be observed.
To date, the Court has not ruled on this issue, but Advocate
General Kokott has expressed her views on it on two occasions.
In Stichting Natuur en Milieu, 44 she dismissed the abovementioned reading of the emissions rule, preferring to define
"emissions" to mean "the direct or indirect release of
substances, vibrations, heat or noise from individual or diffuse
sources into the air, water or land". 45 In the circumstances, one
might be forgiven for finding her position a little radical,
although it should be said that the matters mentioned in the
previous paragraph of the present article were not before the
Court in that case. Also worthy of note is the statement in the
same Opinion to the effect that the "emissions rule" applies to
"information on the release [of emissions into the environment]

contrast, it is not clear that Article 15, which pertains to the right to choose an
occupation and to engage in work, is in point.
43. Council Decision 94/800/EC Concerning the Conclusion on Behalf of The
European Community, as Regards Matters Within its competence, of the Agreements
Reached in the Uruguay Round Multilateralnegotiations 1994 0.. L 336/214. See infra
note 44.

44. See [2010] E.C.R. I-6191.
45. Id. at [91.
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as such."4b This appears to be an acknowledgement on the
Advocate General's part that the "emissions rule" must not be
construed widely.
More recently, in Ville de Lyon,47 the same Advocate General
proved to be more sympathetic to a narrow reading of the
emissions rule. She found that that rule only covered
information
about
actual,
not
potential
emissions.
Consequently, the rule did not apply to information about
greenhouse gas emissions licences owned by a particular person,
because that person would not necessarily make use of those
licences.
At all events, it is expected that the General Court will rule
on the meaning and scope of the emissions rule in Stichting
Greenpeace Nederland and another v. Commission.48 As will now be
explained, that case relates to documents held by the
Commission and Directive 2003/4 itself is therefore not
engaged; but that ought not to be of any consequence, since the
emissions rule is also enshrined in the provisions governing
documents held by the Union's institutions and bodies.
C. Information Held by the Union's Institutions and Bodies
At Union level, Regulation 1049/20014 applies as adapted
by Articles 3 to 8 of Regulation 1367/2006 of the European
Parliament and the Council on the application of the Aarhus
Convention to Union institutions and bodies ("the Aarhus

46. Id. at 1[ 93.
47. SeeCase C-524/09, [2010] E.C.R. I-14115.
48. Stichting Greenpeace Nederland v. European Commission, Case T-545/11,
[2011] E.C.R. I
(pending). In this case, the applicant NGOs seek the annulment of
a Commission decision refusing to divulge documents on an active substance contained
in a plant protection product: the Conmission maintains that these docuncnts contain
business secrets.
49. This Regulation has been extended to the Union's various executive agencies.
See e.g. Council Regulation No. 1907/2006 Concerning the Registration, Authorization
and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. L 396/1 [hereinafter REACH
Regulation]. Thus, by virtue of Article 118(1) of the REACH Regulation of the
European Parliament and the Council as amended (2006 OJ L396/1), it applies to the
European Chemicals Authority, which administers REACH.
For the 2008 Commission proposal for recasting Regulation 1049/2001, see COM
(2008) 229 Final (April 2008). Following protracted negotiations with the Parliament
and the Council, the Commission revised its proposal: see COM (2011) 137, (March
2011). Negotiations are still under way.
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Regulation"). These provisions go well beyond the Aarhus
Convention in one crucial respect: whereas documents
emanating from public authorities acting in a legislative capacity
fall outside the scope of the Convention, nothing in these
Regulations requires or even permits documents to be withheld
on these grounds. Indeed, the sixth recital in the preamble to
Regulation 1049/2001 even states that wider access should be
given to documents when institutions are acting in their
legislative capacity.51
Furthermore, one of the effects of Article 6(1) of the
Aarhus Regulation is to extend the "emissions rule" beyond the
protection of business secrets so as to override the exceptions in
Article 4(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 relating to the protection
of intellectual property and the protection of inspections and
audits. The proceedings in Greenpeace Nederland,5 in which a
ruling on the meaning and scope of the emissions rule is
anticipated, relates to these provisions.
SECOND PILLAR: INVOL EMENT IN DECISION-MAKING
The second pillar of the Convention comprises Articles 6 to
8, of which Article 6 is by far the most important. Article 6
closely resembles the EIA Directive as it stood in 1998.51 Article

50. The Aarhus Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1, at 27-28. Other specifc measures
on access to documents are to be found in a number of other Union acts, including
Article 118 of the REACH Regulation. Supra note 49.
51. See Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v. Council of the European
Union, Case C-39/05P, [2008] E.C.R. I-4723 1 46 ("The possibility for citizens to find
out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the
effective exercise of their democratic rights."); see also Mufniz v. Commission, Case T144/05, [2008] E.C.R. II-0335.
52. Case T-545/11 (pending).
53. The EIA Directive, supra note 9; see DE SADELEER, COMMENTATRE MEGRET,

supra note 31, at 167ff; JAN H. JANs & HANS H.B. VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 346-54 (4th ed., 2012) (describing the EIA directive); lIi I G KRAMER, FU
ENVIRONMENTAL
LA W
155ff
(7th
ed.,
2011);
Bilun
Miller,
Die
Offentlichkeitsbetciligung im Recht der Europaischen Union und ihre Einwirkungen
aul das deutsche Verwaltungsrecht am Beispiel des Irmissionsschutzrechts (Nomos,
2010): AINE RYALL, EFFECTIVEJUDICIAL PROTECTION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
DIRECTIVE IN IRELAND (2009). Specifically on the case law, see Marc CLEMENT, DROIT
E ROPEEN
DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT
(2d
ed.,
2012);
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF PROJECTS: RULINGS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICL
(2013)
(discussing
case
law pertaining
to
the Convention),
available at

http://ec.europa.eu/environrment/eia/pdf/eiacase_1aw.pdf.
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6(1) (a) requires the Parties to carry out an EIA with respect to
the projects listed in Annex I to the Convention, while by virtue
of Article 6(1) (b) they are obliged to do likewise for other
projects which "may have a significant impact on the
environment."54

Article 7 requires Parties to make appropriate provision for
the public to "participate during the preparation of plans and
programmes relating to the environment." Whereas Article 6
concerns the construction of individual projects such as airports,
cables or roads, Article 7 concerns plans or programmes; these
may be area plans covering a particular district or region, or
plans covering the whole territory of a Contracting Party but
relating to a specific subject-matter such as the reduction in the
use of nitrates in agriculture. A number of the procedural
provisions in Article 6 are incorporated into Article 7 by
reference.5
Article 8 of the Convention has already been discussed in
Part I.B above.

54. Aarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(1) (b), at 8. In relation to the EIA, the
Aarhus Convention was preceded by the Espoo Convention, which was signed in 1991,
came into force in 1997 and is still in force. See Espoo Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 2008 O.J. L 308/33 [hereinafter The
Espoo
Convention],
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eui/LexUriServ/
LexUriSci,.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:308:0033:0034:EN:PDF. Like the Aarhus Convention, the
Espoo Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the UN Economic
Commission for Europe and the EU, and all its Member States are parties. The Union
approved the Espoo Convention by a decision of June 27. 1997. The decision is
unpublished but for a reference in an explanatory memorandum. See Council
Decision on the Approval of the First and Second Amendments to the Espoo
Convention, COM (2007) 470 Final (Aug. 2007). The Espoo Convention only requires
the environmental impact assessment of projects which have significant adverse
transboundary impact, and its enforcement mechanisms are relatively weak. See
generall Jonas Ebbesson, A Alodest Contribution to EnvironmentalDemocracy andJustice in
Transboundary Contexts: the Combined Inpact of the Espoo Convention and the Aarhus
Convention, 20(3) REV. OF FUR. COMMUNITY& INT'L ENVT'i L. 248 (2011)
55. Before the EU concluded the Aarhus Convention, the European Parliament
and the Council adopted Council Directive 2001/42/EC on the Assessment of the
Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, 2001 O.J. I 197/30. See
also Artice 2 of Council Directive 2003/35/EC Providing for Public Participation in
Respect of the Drawing Up of Certain Plans and Programs Relating to the
Environment, 2003 O.J. I 156/17 [hereinafter Public Participation Directive]. The
Espoo Convention was approved on behalf of the Union by Council Decision of

October 20, 2008 (2008 OJ. L 308/33) and cane into force on July 11. 2010. See The
Espoo Convention, supra note 54.
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THIRD PILLAR: ACCESS TOJUSTICE
A. General
Access to justice is undoubtedly the piece de ristanceof the
Convention and the area which gives rise to the most delicate
questions.
All the provisions of the Convention relating to the third
pillar are enshrined in Article 9. Paragraph 1 provides in essence
that a review procedure must be made available to disappointed
applicants for access to information. This review procedure is to
be carried out "by a court of law or another independent and
impartial body established by law." If the Contracting Parties opt
to confer jurisdiction over such review procedures on law courts,
they must ensure that applicants also have "access to an
expeditious procedure established by law that is free of charge
or inexpensive for reconsideration by a public authority or
review by an independent and impartial body other than a court
of law."
Article 9(2) relates exclusively to projects covered by Article
6. Since this provision has been reproduced with only minor
amendments in the Directives which we will consider below,
there is no need to set out the terms of Article 9(2) itself. Suffice
it to say at this juncture that the rights of action laid down by
Article 9(2) are akin to those deriving from the principle of
effectiveness enshrined in Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, but with a
major additional dimension: by virtue of Articles 2(5) and 9(2)
of the Convention, these rights of action extend to
environmental NGOs, as long as they fulfil certain conditions
and are recognized by a Contracting State. As already
mentioned, this is perhaps the greatest innovation introduced
by the Aarhus Convention.
Article 9(3) reads as follows:
"In addition, and without prejudice to the review
procedures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each Party
shall ensure that, where they meet the criteria, if any, laid down
by its national law, members of the public have access to
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and
omissions by private persons and public authorities which
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contravene provisions of its national laws relating to the
environment."
This provision applies to all disputes relating to matters
outside both the first pillar and Article 6. Thus even disputes
relating to Article 7 are caught by Article 9(3), even though
Article 7 is part of the second pillar. Unlike most of the
provisions of the Convention, Article 9(3) applies not merely to
the acts and omissions of public authorities, but also to those of
private persons.
According to Article 9(4), "the procedures referred to in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above shall provide adequate and effective
remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair,
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive."
Article 9(5) provides that the Parties are required to ensure
that the public receives information on access to the review
procedures. In addition, it requires them to "consider the
establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove
or reduce financial and other barriers to access to justice."
At this juncture, it is once again necessary to consider the
implementation of Article 9 by the Union at national level
separately from implementation with regard to the acts of the
Union's own institutions and bodies.
B. At National Level
1. Article 9(1) of the Convention
Article 9(1) was implemented with respect to the Member
States by Article 6 of Directive 2003/4. As required by Article
9(1) of the Convention, Article 6(1) of the Directive requires
that in any event an administrative review procedure must be
available and that it must be expeditious and either free of
charge or inexpensive. In addition, Article 6(2) of the Directive
imposes an obligation on Member States to "ensure that an
applicant has access to a review procedure before a court of law
or another independent and impartial body established by law."
HWhile the language of Article 6(2) is faithful to the wording
of Article 9 of the Convention, it is arguable that this language
cannot be taken at face value: insofar as it appears to allow
Member States to preclude access to the courts altogether, it
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would seem to be at variance with the principle of effectiveness
enshrined in Aiticle 19(1) TEU and the right of access to justice
laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the Union.56 We shall return to this issue in the next section.
2. Article 9(2) of the Convention
With a view to implementing certain provisions of the
Convention, the Parliament and the Council adopted Directive
2003/35.57
Article 3(1) inserted into Article 1(2) of the EIA Directive
definitions of the terms "public" and "public concerned" which
reproduce with minor adjustments those in Article 2(4) and
2(5) of the Convention.58 Article 3(7) inserted a provision,
Article 10a, into the EIA Directive; in the current EIA Directive,
namely Directive 2011/ 9 2,59 that provision has become Article
11. In view of its very considerable importance, it must
reproduced here in extenso. This provision reads as follows:
"1. Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the
relevant national legal system, members of the public
concerned:
(a) having a sufficient interest, or alternatively;
(b) maintaining the impairment of a right, where
administrative procedural law of a Member State requires this as
a precondition;
have access to a review procedure before a court of law or
another independent and impartial body established by law to
challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts

56. See Rosalba Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, Case C-317/08, [2010] E.C.R. I2213. 1 54 (" [T]hc outcome of the settlement procedure is not binding on the parties
concerned and thus does not prejudice their right to bring kgal proceedings. "); Union
Nationale des Entraineurs v. Heylens, Case C-222/86, [1987] FC.R. I-4097; johnston v.
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case C-222/84. [1986] E.C.R. I-1651.
For recent litciature on the principle of effectiveness. see Anthony Ainull, The Principle
of EfJfetive Judicial Protection in EU Law: an Vhruly Horse, 36 EL R. L. REV. 51, 55-56
(2011); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GLNLRAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAw 418-76 (2d cd. 2006)
(describing the principle of effectiveness).
57. See public participation Directive, supra note 55.
58. See Aarhus Convention, supra note 1. art. 2(4)-(5). For definitions see supra
note 20 and accompanying text.

59. The EIA Directive, supra note 9.
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or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of this
Directive.

2. Member States shall determine at what stage the
decisions, acts or omissions may be challenged.
3. What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a
right shall be determined by the Member States, consistently
with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to
justice. To that end, the interest of any non-governmental
organisation meeting the requirements referred to in Article
1(2) shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of point (a) of
paragraph 1 of this Article. Such organisations shall also be
deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the
purpose of point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not exclude the
possibility of a preliminary review procedure before an
administrative authority and shall not affect the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative review procedures prior to
recourse to judicial review procedures, where such a
requirement exists under national law.
Any such procedure shall be fair, equitable, timely and not
prohibitively expensive.
5. In order to further the effectiveness of the provisions of
this Article, Member States shall ensure that practical
information is made available to the public on access to
administrative and judicial review procedures." o
Article 4(4) of Directive 2003/35 inserts the same provision
mutatis mutandis into the IPPC Directive.61 For ease of reference,

60. Id. art. 11. These provisions closely match Article 9(2), (4) and (5) of the
Aarhus Convention. However, for sorne reason, Article 11 does not reproduce the part
of Artile 9(4) of the Convention which lays down a right to interim relief in
appropriate cases. But it was never in doubt that such relief must be available in
appropriate cases. See The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte:
Factortame, Case C-213/89, [1990] E.C.R. I-2433; Unibet Ltd. v. Justitickanslern, Case
C-432/05. [2007] E.C.R. 1-2271 1[ 67 (finding that this right was held to form part of
the principle of effectiveness). This has now been conirrned in Jozef Kri.an and
Others v. SlovenskA inspekcia Livotfnho prosuedia, Case C-416/10. [2013] E.C.R. 1,
1[ 105 (delivered Jan. 15, 2013) (not yet published) (stating that this right is enjoyed
under the EIA Directive).
61. See Public Participation Directive, supra note 55, art. 4(4). See IPPC Directive,
supra note 35: Seveso III Directive, supra note 36. arts. 15(1), 23(b) (incorporating
article 11 of the EIA Directive).
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we shall consider only the provision which is now Article 11 of
the EIA Directive.
Like Article 6(2) of Directive 2003/4, Article 11(1)
purports to give Member States a choice of forum: such disputes
can either be heard by courts of law or by other "independent
and impartial [bodies] established by law." Again, this language
comes straight from Article 9 of the Convention and again it is
questionable whether access to national courts can lawfully be
excluded in view of the principle of effectiveness enshrined in
Article 19(1) TEU and of the right of access to justice laid down
in Article 47 of the Charter.
However, this time we also have the first subparagraph of
Article 11(4), which has no counterpart in Directive 2003/4 and
which reproduces the final subparagraph of Article 9(2) of the
Convention. Conveniently enough, the Court held in Alassini, a
case quite unconnected with the environment and concerning
disputes between telephone companies and their customers,
that it is compatible with the principle of effectiveness for a
Member State to require parties to attempt to reach a settlement
out of court prior to commencing judicial proceedings,
provided

that

certain

conditions

are

met:

the

mediation

procedure must be reasonably affordable, speedy and generally
accessible. 62 These conditions are strikingly similar to those set
out in the second subparagraph of Article 11(4). What is more,
there is every reason to suppose that the principle in Alassini is
also to be applied to a compulsory prior procedure of
administrative review. Accordingly, the first subparagraph of
Article 11(4) appears to be fully compatible with the principle of
effectiveness.
According to the second and third sentences of Article
11 (3), environmental NGOs are deemed to have locus standi,
whether the Member State opts for the test in Article 11(1) (a)
or that in Article 11(1) (b). This reflects Articles 2(5) and 9(2) of
the Convention.s
In recent years, the Court has delivered a raft of judgments
on this Article, which are as important as they are interesting.
62. Case C-317/08 [2010] E.C.R. I-2213,

1

45 ("[S]uch legislation, in so far as it

ensures that out-of-court procedures are systenatically used for settling disputes, is
designed to strengthcn the effectiveness of the Universal Ser vice Directive.").

63. For the text of Article 2(5) of the Convention, see supranote 20.

2013]

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

1447

Before considering this case law, it is as well to point out that the
Court ruled in Delena Vell 4 that the principle of effectiveness
required Member States to ensure that an adequate judicial
remedy was available in the event of a failure to carry out an EIA
required by the EIA Directive - even though the facts arose
before Directive 2003/35 had been enacted. According to this
ruling, wherever possible, the national court should revoke or
suspend the development consent or, failing that, it appears to
suggest that compensation must be awarded.65 We shall now
focus on a number of judgments delivered since the deadline
for implementing Directive 2003/35 expired.
Consequently, subject to one major exception, Article 11
did not break new ground in Union law: it merely lent greater
precision to the obligation on Member States to respect the
principle of effectiveness in relation to the environmental
impact assessments. That exception is the standing conferred on
environmental NGOs to bring judicial proceedings in the
interests of the environment.
Mello#6 raised the issue as to whether a so-called "screening
decision" taken under the EIA Directive must be accompanied
by a statement of the reasoning on which it is based. Projects

falling within Annex I to that Directive require an EIA per se,
whereas those caught by Annex II only require an EIA if, by
virtue of their nature, size or location, they are likely to have
significant effects on the environment. Where the Member State
evaluates the need for an EIA for Annex II projects on a case by
case basis, that is known as a "screening decision." In Mellor, the
competent English authority had granted planning permission
64. The Queen on the Application of Dclena Wells v. Secretary of State for
Transport, Case C-201/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-723.
65. Id. at 1 66 (stating that a Member State is "required to make good any harm
caused by the failure to carry out an environmental impact assessment.."); see Lcth v.
Austria, Case C-420/11, [2013] E.C.R. I
(delivered Mar. 14, 2013) (not yet
published). The findings resulting from an EIA are not binding, as the responsible
body is merely bound to take those findings into account in the devclopmcnt conscnt
procedure. Directive 2011/92 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and
private projects on the environment. 2012 O.J. L 26, art. 8. Thus, generally speaking,
where a project is realised without the requisite EIA, it is not obvious that a causal link
can be established between the breach of the EIA Directive and any darnage or less
resulting from the project. as the Court recognised in Leth.
66. Mellor v. Secretary of State for Comm unitLies and Local Governimnt., Case C-

75/08, [2009] E.C.R. 1-3799.
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for a particular project some weeks after the deadline for
implementing Directive 2003/35 had expired, without making
available either the requisite screening decision or the reasons
on which it was based.
As the reader will be aware, Article 41(2) (c) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights read with Article 41(1) requires the
institutions and bodies of the Union to state the reasons on
which their legal acts are based; but these provisions are not
expressed to apply to the Member States. 67 Moreover, some EU
legislative provisions require certain acts of the Member States
to be reasoned;68 but screening decisions are not governed by
any such provision. Consequently, it is necessary to cast our
minds back to 1987 when the Court delivered its judgment in
Heylens. 69 In that case, which was quite unrelated to
environmental law, it was held that, for national courts to be in a
position to carry out effective judicial control, either the
individual decision of a national authority must contain the
reasons on which it is based or those reasons must subsequently
be communicated to the person concerned.7 11
In Mellor, Advocate General Kokott found that the
statement of reasons must in principle be communicated to the

person concerned at the same time as the measure which
adversely affects him. 1 In support of this proposition, she relied

67. In view of its specific wording, Ar tice 41 constitutes an exception to Article
51(1), which states that the Charter extends to the Member States when they act within
the scope of EU law. Nevertheless, the Court appears to consider that the Mcinber
States, when so acting, are bound by Article 41(2) (a) laying down a pcrson's right to be
heard, before they take an individual measure which would affect him or her adversely
-or more probably by a general principle to the same effect. See Case C-277/11 M.M. v
Minister for Justice (judgment of 22 November 2012), paras. Sl1f., and. 36 of AG
Kokott's Opinion in Case C-276/ 12 Sabou (pending).
68. Some examplcs are to be found in Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs,
Mellor. [20091 E.C.R. 1-3799, 1 45.
69. Union Nationale des Entraineurs v. Heylens, Case C-222/86, [1987] E.C.R. I4097.
70. Id. 1 15 ("[T] he competent national authority is under a duty to inform them
of the reasons on which its refusal is based, either in the decision itself or in a
subsequent communication made at their request."); Vlassopoulou v. Ministeriun fir
Justiz, Bundes, Case C-340/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2357, 1 22 (stating that "the person
concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons for the decision."); Sodemare and
others v. Regione Lombardia, Case C-70/95, [1997] I-3395 1 19, 20 (holding that this
requirement does not extend to "national rules of general scope.").

71. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Mellor, 120091 E.C.R. I-377, [ 45.
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on a wealth of case law to the effect that in principle the absence
of an adequate statement of reasons could not be cured during
the proceedings before the Court of Justice or the General
Court, as the case may be.7 2 The Court confirmed its position in
Heylens, finding that it was unnecessary for the screening
decision itself to contain the reasoning, adding: "However, if an
interested party so requests, the competent administrative
authority is obliged to communicate to him the reasons for the
determination . . ."
More recently, the Court ruled to the same effect in
Solvay, 74 which concerned the final decision granting
development consent. The Belgian Constitutional Court asked
whether Article 6(9) of the Convention and Aiticle 9(1) of the
EIA Directive required such an act to contain all the
information necessary to establish whether it was based on an
adequate prior evaluation. The wording of Article 6(9) of the
Convention, which had not been mentioned in Mellor, arguably
suggests that the statement of reasons must be made available at
the same time as the decision itself;7 and the same might
perhaps be said of Article 9(1) of the EIA Directive which
implements that provision in Union law. Nevertheless, ruling
without the benefit of an Opinion from the Advocate General,
the Court reached the same conclusion in Solvay as in Mellor.
For the public authorities, the rulings in Mellor and Solvay
present an obvious advantage: those authorities are not put to
72. Id. at n.45
73. Mellor v. Secretary of State for Colimunities and Local Government, Case C75/08, [2009] E.C.R. I-3799, [ 61. This ruling might appear to be a step back from the
judgment in Commission v. Italy. Case C-87/02. [2004] E.C.R. 1-5975. 1[ 49 (" [A]
decision by which the national competent authority takes the view that a project's
characteristics do not require it to be subjected to an [EIA] must contain or be
accompanied by all the information that makes it possible to check that it is based on
adequate screening."). See iellor. [20091_E.C.R. 1-3799, 1 56 (declining to confirm
Comrmission v. Italy on the grounds that it "does not follow ... that a determination not
to subject a project to an ETA must, itself. contain the reasons for which the competent
authority determined that an assessment was unnecessary.").

74. Solvay and Others v. Region wallonne, Case C-182/10, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered February 16, 2012) (not yet published).
75. Aarhus Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(9), at 9 (providing that "Each Party
shall ensure that, when the decision has been taken by the public authority, the public
is promptly informed of the decision in accordance with the appropriate procedures.
Each Party shall make accessible to the public the text of the decision along with the

reasons and considerations on which the decision is based.") (emphasis added).
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the trouble and expense of supplying the reasoning unless an
interested party requests it. The only difficulty posed by these
two rulings concerns timing: if the opponent of the project
requests the reasoning promptly but the public authority fails to
supply it with due speed, it may be impossible or at least
extremely difficult for the opponent to commence judicial
proceedings within the limitation period set in national law.
Plainly, that would run counter to the principle of
effectiveness.7 However, it seems clear that the limitation period
cannot begin to run until the putative litigant is informed of the
content of the act concerned and is given sufficient knowledge
of the reasoning on which it is based to enable him or her to
reach an informed decision as to whether or not to contest it.
Broadly speaking, that approach appears to be in line with that
followed by Advocate General Kokott in Mellor.
At all events, the Court's rulings in Djurgarden and
9 have understandably attracted far more attention.
TrianeP
Djurgdrden related inter alia to a provision of Swedish law
according to which the only NGOs entitled to seek judicial
review of a decision on development consent were those with at
least 2,000 members. Sweden acknowledged that only two NGOs
in the entire country met this requirement.!As already
mentioned, it follows from what are now Articles 1(2) and 11 of
the EIA Directive that environmental NGOs "meeting any
requirements under national law" are to be regarded as having
locus standi to challenge such a decision. Although this language
does not in terms fetter the discretion of the Member States in

76. Manfredi and Others v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others, joined
Cases C-295-298/04. [2006] E.C.R. 1-6619 (prescribing limitation periods for seeking
compensation for harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited by the principle
of effectiveness).
77. In effect, that isthe position taken by the Court of Justice and the General
Court in relation to what is now the final paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Konecke v.
Commission. Case 76/79, [1980] E.C.R. 665. 1[ 7: Evropailki Dynamilki v. Commission,
Case T-442/11. [2012] E.C.R.
_ 1[ 79 (delivered October 12, 2012) (not yet
reported).
78. Djurgdirden-Lilla Vtrtans MiljCaskyddsforcning v. Stockholmskonimun genon
dess inarkndimnd, Case C-263/08. [2009] E.C.R. 1-9967, with annotation by Aine Ryall, 47
COMMON MIKT. I REV. 1511 (2010).
79. Bund fur Um11welt und NaturschutLz Deutschland Landesverband NordrheinWestfalen cV v. Bezirksregicrung Ainsberg, interveningpartY: TrianelKohlekrafwerk Case
C-I 15/09, [2011] E.C.R. 1-3673.
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any way, the Court held in effect that the Member States could
not impose requirements which frustrated the purpose of these
provisions.

The Court recognised that Article 11 gives Member States
some latitude in laying down the conditions under which NGOs
may bring judicial proceedings; but it also pointed out that,
according to that provision, Member States must ensure "wide
access to justice."80 The Court found it to be "conceivable" that
such a minimum membership requirement might be "relevant"
in order to ensure that the NGO "does in fact exist and that it is
active.""' However, the number of members required could not
be fixed at such a level that it ran counter to the objectives of
the EIA Directive and in particular the objective of "facilitating
judicial review of projects which fall within its scope."8 2
Moreover, it did not suffice for members of the public
concerned to be allowed to participate in the EIA process in
conformity with Article 6(4) of the Directive: they must also
enjoy access to the courts, if need be. 8" Finally, the Court
pointed out that the Directive does not exclusively concern
projects on a national or regional scale, but also projects more
limited in size which locally based associations are better placed
to deal with; and it concurred with AG Sharpston's finding that
the Swedish rule in issue deprived such local associations of any
judicial remedy.84
80. Djurgdrden, [2009] E.C.R. 1-9967, 1 45.
81. Id. 47.
82. Id.
83. Id. 48.
84. Djurgdirden-Lilla Vaitans Miljoskyddsfrnrcing v. Stockholns kominun genoi
dess marknfimnd, Case C-263/08. [2009] E.C.R. 1-9967, 1[ 50 (referring to Advocate
General's opinion).

Frequently, Member States require NGOs to have existed for a certain period of
time before they can exercise rights under Ai ticles 1(2) and 11 of the EIA Directive:
the purpose is to avoid conferring rights on an association formed on an ad hoc basis to
combat a particular project. 'Where the requisite period of activity is two years or lss, it
is hard to argue that such a condition is repugnant to the Directive: the Aarhus
Regulation itself requires NGOs to have existed for more than two years if they are to
seek an internal review of an administLrative act pursuant to Article 10 of that
Regulation. See supra note 47; infra note 115 and accompanying text. However, if a
Member State were to lay down a significantly longer minimum period, that would
surely be contrary to the Directive on the same basis as the Swedish measure in issue in
Djurgarden.Ryall argues that a three-year ininimumi period is too long. Ryall, supra note
78, at 1520.
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As to Trianel, the ruling by the Grand Chamber has been
very much in the limelight, at least in Germany A'Trianel was a
company which intended to construct a power station close to
five areas designated as special areas of conservation within the
meaning of the Habitats Directive.86 The plaintiff before the
national court, an environmental NGO which was duly
recognised in German law pursuant to Article 2(5) of the
Convention and Article 1(2) of the EIA Directive, contested the
decision of the local authority to grant a permit for the
operation of the power station, on the basis that it was in breach
of the Habitats Directive and various other environmental laws. 7
However, the NGO was unable to show that its own rights had
been impaired in consequence of the alleged illegality of the
contested act, as required by German law; and it therefore
lacked locus standi in national law. The German court therefore
made a reference for a preliminary ruling in which it asked in
effect whether this requirement was compatible with what is now
Article 11 of the EIA Directive.
Following Advocate General Sharpston, the Court of Justice
replied in the negative. It held that Member States cannot, when
determining what rights can give rise, when infringed, to an
action concerning the environment

"deprive environmental

protection organisations which fulfil the conditions laid down in
Article 1(2) of [the EIA Directive] of the opportunity of playing
the role granted to them both by [that Directive] and by the

85. Bund fur Uinwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland. Landesverband NordrheinWestfalen eV v. Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, intervening party: Triane Kohlekraftwerk, Case
C-115/09. [2011] E.C.R. I-3673. The shcer wealth of case notes on this judgment is a
testimony to its importance, e.g., Appel. 33 NATUR UND RLCHT (NLUR) 414 (2011);
Gassner NUR 37 (2012); Brita Henning, Eneiterug der Klagerechte anehanter
Umweltverblinde - Chance auf mehr Umweltschutz oder Investitionshindernis?, 38 NEUF
JURISTISCHLWOCHENSCHRIFT 2765 (2011); Eva Julia Lohse, Surprse? Surprise!- Case C
115/09 (Kohlekraftwerij Lunen) - A victoy for the Envirnment and a Loss for Procedural
Autonony of the Member States ?, EUR. PUB. L 249 (2012); Meitz S3 NU R 420 (2011); Bilun
Muller, Access to the Courts of the Member States for NGOs in Environmental Matters under
European Union Law, 23 J. ENvTL L. 505 (2011); klexander Schmidt, Zschiesche and
Tijanowski (2012) 34 NuR 77. Schwerdtfeger 2012 Europarecht 80.
86. Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and
Wild Fauna and Flora, 1992 O.J. 1, 206/7.
87. The referring court and the Court of.Justicc worked on the premise that the
case fell under Article 9(2) of the Convention and what is now Article 11 of the EIA

Directive, not Article 9(3) of the Convention.

2013]

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

1453

Aarhus Convention."8 8 While it was open to Member States to
require individuals to show that they personally had suffered the
impairment of a right, the final sentence of what is now Article
11 (3) precluded such a limitation being applied to
environmental NGOs." Moreover, the "rights capable of being
impaired" which environmental NGOs enjoy pursuant to the last
sentence of what is now Article 11(3) of the Directive "must
necessarily include the rules of national law implementing EU
environmental law and the rules of EU environmental law
having direct effect."911
Finally, the Court ruled that, taken as a whole, what is now
Article 11 of the EIA Directive lacks direct effect, since it gives
the Member States "a significant discretion both to determine
what constitutes impairment of a right and, in particular, to
determine the conditions for the admissibility of actions and the
bodies before which such actions may be brought."9" However,
the same was not true of the last two sentences of Article 11(3)
which were precise and not subject to any further conditions. 2
In short, rules of locus standi such as those in force in
Germany were held to run counter to the last two sentences of
Article 11(3), according to which nationally recognised
environmental NGOs automatically have locus standi before
national courts; and those two sentences were held to be directly
effective. On both points, this ruling is scarcely surprising, given
the clear wording of the two sentences.
Some further poignant issues have arisen in Altrip,9 a
reference for a preliminary ruling from Germany's Supreme
Administrative Court. First of all, it would seem that only the
complete failure to carry out an EIA, where it is required, would
lead the German courts to annul a decision granting
development consent; but this remedy would be denied where
88. Bund. [2011] E.C.R. 1-3673, 1 44
89. Id. 45.
90. Id. 48.
91. Bund tihr UmNwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband NordrheinWestfalen cV v. Bezirksregicrung Ai nsberg, interveningpartY: TrianelKohlekrafwerk Case
C-115/09. [2011] E.C.R. 1-3673, 1 55
92. Id. 11 56-57.
93. Geincinde Altrip, Gebroider Hdit GbR, Willi Schneider v. RhinclandPalatinate, Case C-72/12. [2012] E.C.R. I

reported).

(delivered February 13, 2012) (not yet
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an EIA, however seriously flawed, had been carried out. The
referring court asked inter alia whether this state of affairs is
consonant with what is now Article 11 (1) of the ELA Directive.
The answer to this question must surely be that it must be
possible for a litigant to obtain the annulment of such a decision
where it is based on a seriously defective EIA. For a start, Article
11 (1) clearly states that parties must be in a position to
challenge "the substantive or procedural legality of decisions,
acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of
this Directive." 94 Moreover, it was held in Trianel that this
provision does not "in any way [limit] the pleas that could be
put forward in support of such an action." 95 In addition,
Germany's approach is surely at odds with the principle of
effectiveness enshrined in Article 19(1) TEU. Accordingly, the
recent Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villal6n in which he
reached the same conclusion deserves a warm welcome.96
The next question posed by the Supreme Administrative
Court is whether a procedural defect in an ELA can only lead to
the annulment of the ensuing develop consent where there is a
"definite possibility" that the contested decision would have
been different in the absence of that defect.
This is considerably more delicate. It should be recalled
that, in the absence of a good reason to do otherwise, the Court
of Justice takes its own remedies and procedures as a yardstick
for determining whether national judicial remedies and
procedures are compatible with the principle of effectiveness.97
This appears to be the appropriate approach to take in this
context. On this basis, it is submitted that procedural errors
should be divided into three separate categories: those which
are so grave that they must lead automatically to the annulment
of the contested decision; 8 those which only lead to that result
where the contested act might have been different if they had

9' Emphasis added

95. Bund, [2011] E.C.R. 1-3673. 37.
Opinion of 20June 2013.
97. Brasserie du Picheur v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cases C-46/93, [1996]
E.C.R. I-1029. 1[1[ 40-42: Upjohn Ltd. v. The Licensing Authority, C-120/97. [1999]
E.C.R. I-223, 1[ 34.
98. Roquette Freres v. Council, Case 138/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1-3333.
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not been committed;" and those which are so trivial that they
must be disregarded altogether. "I
Broadly speaking, in
Advocate General Cruz Villal6n has endorsed this approachor
and again this should be warmly welcomed. The judgment is
awaited with considerable interest.
Finally, another issue which may well come before the
Court in the coming years relates to the rule known in Germany
as Prdkusion.102 According to this rule, a party may only advance
arguments before the courts which it has previously advanced,
or had the opportunity to advance, during the EIA leading to
the contested decision on development consent. The analogy
with the case law of the General Court on the same issue where a
party has failed to raise an argument during the administrative
phase leading to a Commission decision on a State aid would
strongly suggest that Prdkusion is at variance with the principle
of effectiveness: in that context, the Court has consistently held
that "nothing prevents the interested party from raising against
the final decision a legal plea not raised at the stage of the
administrative procedure."1 o
On the other hand, it is surely lawful for a national legal
system to treat as inadmissible a court action lodged by a party

who failed to intervene during the EIA procedure at all, even
though it had a genuine opportunity to done so. After all, the
whole purpose of the EIA is to give members of the public
concerned the opportunity to voice their opinions on a project
before the decision on development consent is taken.1 4
99. Thyssen Stahl v. Conmission, Case C-194/99P. [2003] E.C.R. I-10821, 1 31
and rulings cited there.
100. Kingdom of Spain v. Commission, Case 128/86. [1987] E.C.R. 4171.
Id. paras. 79 - 106.
102. See Uinwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz [Law on judicial renedies in environmental
matters], july 12, 2006, Bundesanzeiger, art. 2(3). The Netherlands appears to have a
similar rule. SeeJans & Vedder, supra note 50, at 233 (noting that according Dutch law,
"a party may not rely on a breach of a legal rule before a court of law unlcss this was
first raised during the preceding public participation procedure.").
103. See Kneiss1 Dachstein Sportartikel AG v. Commission, Case T- 110/97, [1998]
E.C.R. 112881, 1 102 and Saxonia Edclnctalle GnBH v. Commission, Case T-111/01.
[2005] FC.R. II-1579, 1 68 (discussing how legal pleas not raised at the Commission
stage of State aid proceedings are not barred during the proceedings before the
General Court).
"o' It would of course be otherwise if a party was not given a genuine right to participate
in the EIA (e.g. where the deadline for intervening in the EIA is excessively short or

where the project is changed after the EIA is concluded).
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3. Article 9(3) of the Convention
In 2003, with a view to implementing Article 9(3) of the
Convention at national level, the Commission submitted a
proposal for a Directive on the European Parliament and the
Council on access to justice in environmental matters. 0 s Like
Article 9(3) itself, this proposal addressed the acts and omissions
of private persons as well as those of public authorities. In any
case, it fell on stony ground in the Council and has never been
adopted. However, the Commission has recently indicated that
it might take steps to revive this proposal in its present form or
to replace it with a revised proposal. Io With this in mind, the
Commission's Directorate-General for the Environment has
commissioned a study of the implementation of Article 9(3) and
(4) in all the Member States. 107
As to the case law, the judgment in janecek v. Bavaria merits
particular attention, even though the Aarhus Convention was
not even mentioned in that ruling. 0 8 The proceedings turned
on Council Directive 96/62 on ambient air quality assessment
and management. 1 1oThat Directive sets maximum limits for
certain pollutants in the air. In so far as is material, Article 7(3)
reads: "Member States shall draw up action plans indicating the
105. See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and Council on Access tojustice in Environmental Matters, COM (03) 624
Final. 1 3.3 (Oct. 2003) (discussing how this proposal aims to "cstablish a general
framework for access to justice in environmental matters").

106. See European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the
Regions on Improving the Delivery of Benefits From EU Environment Measures:
Building Confidence Through Better Knowledge and Responsiveness, COM (2012) 95
Final, 9 (Mar. 2012) (discussing the importance of access to environmental justice
going forward); see also European Commission, Proposal for a Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a General Union Environment Action
Programme to 2020, COM (2012) 710 Final, 11 60, 63 (Nov. 2012).
107. See JAN DARPO, EUROPEAN COMNIMISSION. EFFECTIVE JUSTICE? SYNTHESIS
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES 9.3 AND 9.4 OF THF AARHUS
CONVENTION IN SEVENTEEN OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2012)
(explaining that this report was commissioned to determine the implementation of

these articles

in specific EU Member States),

awilable at http://ec.europa.eu/

environment /aarhus/pdf/ 2012_accessjustice report.pdf.

108. SeeJanecek v. Bayern, Case C-237/07. [2008] E.C.R. 1-6221 (the material facts
occurred in 2005 and 2006, and both the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/35
were applicable for part of that period).
109. See Council Directive 96/62/EC on Ambient Air Quality Assessment and
Management, 1996 0.L
296/55
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measures to be taken in the short term where there is a risk of
the limit values and/or alert thresholds being exceeded, in
order to reduce that risk and to limit the duration of such an
occurrence." The applicant in the main case resided in an area
of Munich for which no action plan had been established, even
though the data produced by the local air quality measuring
station showed that the maximum limits were regularly
exceeded. Mr Janecek therefore turned to the courts to obtain
an order than an action plan be drawn up. The case reached
Germany's highest administrative court, which made a reference
for a preliminary ruling. In reply, the Court ofJustice ruled that,
where there was a risk that the limits would be exceeded,
"persons directly concerned" must be in a position to compel
the authorities to draw up an action plan, if necessary by means
of court proceedings; but that the purpose of action plans was
merely to reduce to a minimum the risk that the limits would be
exceeded. The Court did not specify what it meant by "persons
directly concerned," a term which was not in Directive 96/62;
but then in the circumstances it was not necessary to do so.
What is especially striking about this judgment is the lowkey manner in which the Court approached this issue. The
Court treated it as a question of interpretation of Directive
96/62 rather than of access to justice; and it even chose to
dispense with the assistance of an Advocate General. Yet there
can be little doubt that this ruling is likely to constitute an
important precedent in the future.
In contrast, great prominence has been given to the
Slovakian Bears case,I10 where the Court of Justice was asked to
rule on whether Article 9(3) of the Convention is directly
effective. The facts have already been set out in this article in
Part C of the Introduction. The Grand Chamber held that this
provision lacked direct effect, since it only applied where "the
criteria, if any, laid down by . . . national law" are met."'

However, having regard to its case law on the principle of
effectiveness, the Court went on to rule that:

110. See Lesoohirantrske v. Ministerstvo (Slovakian Bears), Case C-240/09, [2011]

E.C.R. 1-1255.
"I

Id. [45
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"if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not
to be undermined, it is inconceivable that Aiticle 9(3) of the
Aarhus Convention be interpreted in such a way as to make it in
practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights
conferred by EU law.
It follows that, in so far as concerns a species protected by
EU law, and in particular the Habitats Directive, it is for the
national court, in order to ensure effective judicial protection in
the fields covered by EU environmental law, to interpret its
national law in a way which, to the fullest extent possible, is
consistent with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the
112
Aarhus Convention."
This passage is hard to fathom. Since the principle of
effectiveness only applies to directly applicable provisions, why
did the Court invoke it here? And what is meant by "to the
fullest extent possible"?'
4. Article 9(4) of the Convention
As the reader will be aware, Article 9(4) requires that
judicial proceedings in environmental matters must not be
"prohibitively expensive"; and this requirement is implemented
by what is now Article 11(4) of the EIA Directive. To date, the
only authority on the meaning of the term "prohibitively
expensive" is the judgment in Edwards.1 14
The facts arose out of proceedings for judicial review of a
decision to grant a permit for the operation of a cement factory
in Rugby in the English Midlands. Mr Edwards, a local resident,
claimed that that decision was in breach of the EIA Directive.
Subsequently, another local resident, a Mrs. Pallikoroupos, took
over the action, although she was not legally aided. The case
ultimately reached the House of Lords, then England's highest
court, which dismissed the appeal. For the proceedings in the
House of Lords she was ordered to pay over £88,000 to the
respondents in addition to the costs due to her own lawyers.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom,
112. Id. 1149-50.
113. See Simon, supranote 30 (describing this passage as a "session de rattrapage").
114. The Queen, on the application of David Edwards v. Environmel Agency,
(delivered on 11 April 2013) (not yet reported).
Case C-260/11, [2013] E.C.R. I
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which by then had replaced the House of Lords as the highest
court in the land, posed a series of preliminary questions as
whether such costs were compatible with the "prohibitively
expensive" rule.

In a remarkable judgment, which breaks totally new
ground, the Court found that the requirement that judicial
proceedings should not be prohibitively expensive means that
the persons concerned must not be "prevented from seeking, or
pursuing a claim for, a review by the courts that falls within the
scope of [the provisions in issue] by reason of the financial
burden that might arise as a result."
When assessing this, the
national courts "cannot act solely on the basis of [the]
claimant's financial situation but must also carry out an objective
analysis of the amount of the costs". 1" In so doing, the national
courts "may also take into account the situation of the parties
concerned, whether the claimant has a reasonable chance of
success, the importance of what is at stake for the claimant and
for the protection of the environment, the complexity of the
relevant law and procedure, the potentially frivolous nature of
the claim at its various stages, and the existence of a national
legal aid scheme or a costs protection scheme." '1
At the same time, the Commission brought infringement
proceedings against the United Kingdom, complaining of a
systemic failure in England and Wales as well as in Scotland and
Northern Ireland to comply with the "prohibitively expensive"
rule.' '1
An unusual feature of these cases is that the Commission
and Mrs. Pallikaropoulos have been able to rely on two reports
drafted by a committee chaired by a senior member of the
English judiciary which bluntly stated that the costs awarded by
the English courts are regularly in breach of the Aarhus
Convention. '1

Para. 35
Para. 46
"

Ibid.

118. Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-530/11, (action brought on Oct. 18,
2011) (pending)
119 . The Sullivan Report entitled WORKING GROUP ON ACCESS TO
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE. ENSURING ACLSS To ENVIRONMENTAL JLUSTICE IN ENGLAND

ANT)

WALES,

(2008),

available

at

http://www.wwf.org.uk/
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C. At Union Level
1. Article 9(1) of the Convention
It has always been plain that, where information has been
requested from a Union institution or body pursuant to
Regulation 1049/2001, an action lies directly to the General
Court against a total or partial refusal of that request. hat is
more, an administrative review is built into Regulation
1049/2001 (Article 7(2)). Accordingly, there was no need for
the Union to take any steps to implement Article 9(1) at the
level of the Union. 12
2. Article 9(2) of the Convention
As we noticed earlier, Article 9(2) of the Convention
provides for rights of action to challenge decisions granting
development consent for projects covered by Article 6(1) and
(2). Such decisions are taken by the Member States, not the
institutions of the Union.
Perhaps the only exception to this rule would arise where
the Union funds a construction project despite the fact that the
requisite ELA or IPPC procedure has not been carried out. That
was precisely the situation which occurred in Greenpeace
International and others v. Commission, decided before the
Convention entered into force. 121
The Court held there that the Commission's decision to
finance the construction of two power stations in the Canary
Islands did not concern the NGOs or the individual local
residents either directly or individually. In the unlikely event of
an EU institution or body adopting a similar decision today, the
NGOs would be able to seek a review of the financing decision
pursuant to Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation which is
discussed below.

vo fIarticles.cfinunewvsid=1754; see id. at para. 5. In August 2010, the committee
published an update to that report, available on the same website.
120. As aready mentioned, Regulation 1049/2001 was adapted by Articles 3 to 8
of the Aarhus Regulation to take account of the first pillar of the Aarhus Convention.
However, these provisions do not concern access to justice, the subject matteLr of Ar ticle
9(1) of the Convention.

121. Case C-321/95P, [1998] E.C.R. I-1651.
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3. Article 9(3) of the Convention
Plainly, the principles laid down in the Slovakian Bears
judgment apply equally to the Court of Justice itself. However, it
is equally manifest that the mere fact that Article 9(3) of the
Convention lacks direct effect in no way absolves the Union
from complying with that provision.
As is well known, the rules on locus standi for annulment
actions brought by parties other than Member States or Union
institutions enshrined in Article 230 EC were widely regarded as
excessively restrictive. As the reader will also be aware, the
Treaty of Lisbon addressed this problem by adding a final limb
to what is now Article 263, paragraph 4 TFEU. According to that
limb, natural and legal persons have standing to seek the
annulment of a "regulatory act which is of direct concern to
them and does not entail implementing measures."' 1 Where
these conditions are fulfilled, the applicant need not show that
he or she is individually concerned by the contested act.
Although natural and legal persons will frequently be in a
position to challenge the legality of several "regulatory acts"
under that limb, it is of no avail to NGOs, unless they can show
that their own legal situation is directly affected by the contested
act.123
122. Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 263(4), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 162. In luit Tapiriit Kanatami v. European
Parliament and Council the Court held that the terim "regulatoly act" covered acts of
general application other than legislative acts. Case T-18/10, [2011], E.C.R. II
56
(delivered Sept. 6. 2011) (not yet reported). The appeal against this judgmcnt is still
pending. See Inuit Tapiriit Kanataini and Otheirs v. European Parliament and Council
of the European Union, Case C-58/1 1P (pending case). Advocate General Kokott has
urged the Court to uphold the General Court's judgment on this point. Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, Init Tapiiit Kanatami, [2013] E.C.R. I_
[T 26-61, but in
his Opinion of 29 May 2013 in Case C-I32/12 Stichting Woonpunt (pending)
Advocate General Wathelet advocated a radically different approach. In any case, the
exclusion of lkgislative acts is of no consequence as regards the Aarhus Convention
since, by virtue of Article 2(2) thereof, the acts of public authorities acting "in their
legislative capacity" are excluded from its scope. See supra, Part B of the Introduction.
As to what is icant by "does not entail impleienting measures," see Telef6nica v
Commission. Case T-228/10, [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered March 21, 2012) (not yet
reported). The case is now on appeal. See Tclef6nica v. Commission, Case C-274/12P
(pending).
123. See Microban v. Commission, Case T-262/10, [2011], E.C.R. II_,
27
(delivered Oct. 25. 2011) (not yet published); see also Inuit Tapiriit Kanatani v.
European Parliament and Council, Case T-18/10. [2011] E.C.R. II_, 1f 71 (delivered
Sept. 6, 2011) (not yet published) (confirming earlier case law). In her Opinion on the
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Theoretically, of course, an NGO could always attempt to
argue, when contesting an act of environmental law, that its own
legal situation is indeed directly at stake since it is deemed by
virtue of Articles 2(5) and 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention to
have an interest in environmental decision-making. However, in
the unlikely event that the Court were to accept such an
argument, that would clearly amount to admitting the direct
effect of Article 9(3) by the back door, thereby reversing the
ruling in Slovakian Bears and creating considerable legal
uncertainty.
To obviate these problems, Article 10 of the Aarhus
Regulation, which predated the Treaty of Lisbon, created a
mechanism whereby NGOs - but not other parties - can request

the internal review of an "administrative act under
environmental law," or the alleged failure to adopt such an
act.124 Crucially, Article 2(1) (g) defines "administrative act" to
mean "any measure of individual scope under environmental
law, taken by a Community institution or body, and having
legally binding and external effects."1 25
According to Article 10, the request must be addressed to
the Union institution or body which adopted the act, or should
have adopted it, within six weeks of its adoption, notification or
publication, whichever is the latest. In case of an alleged
omission, the six-week period begins to run on the date on
which the administrative act was required. The Commission is
appeal against the latter ruling (Case C-583/1 1P), Advocate General Kokott has in
essence endorsed the traditional test. See Inuit Opinion of Advocate General Kokott,
Inuit Tapirit Kanatani, [2011] E.C.R. II_, It 68-72 (pending case). See generally
Nicolas De Sadclecr & Charles Ponclet, ProtectionAgainst Acts Harmful to Human Health
and the Environment Adopted by the EU Institutions, 14 (AMBRIDGL Y.B. EUR. L. STUD. 177
(2012).
124. For the Aarhus Regulation, supra note 8, art. 10, at 18. see supra note 50. The
Conunission has adopted Decision 2008/401/EC amending its Rules of Procedure with
regard to such requests. 2008 O.J. L 140/22; see Decision 2008/50/EC laying down
detailed rules in relation to this matter, 2008 O.J. L 13/24.
125. See Aarhus Regulation, supra n1otC 8, art. 2(1) (g), at 16. Article 2(2) of the
Aarhus Regulation excludes "measures taken or omissions by a Community institution
or body in its capacity as an adninistrative review body such as under" competition and
State aids rules, infringement proceedings, the proceedings of the European
Ombudsman and proceedings for combatting fraud on the Union budget. See id., art.
2(2), at 16. Some authors object to this provision on the grounds that it creates legal
uncertainty, particularly because the list of exceptions is not exhaustive. SeeDe Sadeicer

& Poncelet, supra note 123, at 199 (citing several sources to that effect).

2013]

ACCESS TO INFORMATION

1463

required to respond within twelve weeks, although it can extend
this deadline by a further six weeks in certain circumstances. To
be eligible to make such a request, an NGO must fulfil the
conditions set out in Article 11.126
Article
12(1)
provides:
"The
non-governmental
organisation which made the request for internal review
pursuant to Article 10 may institute proceedings before the
Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the Treaty."'
The final somewhat Delphic limb of this paragraph may
owe something to the cryptic obiter dictum of the Court of First
Instance in European Environmental Bureau v Commission about
the internal review procedure set out in what was then the
Aarhus Regulation proposal: "[t]he Court notes that the
principles governing the hierarchy of norms (see, inter alia, Case
C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR 1-5383, paragraph
42) preclude secondary legislation from conferring standing on
individuals who do not meet the requirements of the fourth
paragraph of Article 230 EC." 128 Subsequently, however the
Court of Justice took a very different position when it held in
Opinion 1/09 that "an international agreement concluded with
third countries may confer new judicial powers on the Court

provided that in so doing it does not change the essential
character of the function of the Court as conceived in the EU
and FEU Treaties."29 Indeed, even before Opinion 1/09, the
General Court appeared to have abandoned the objection which
it had voiced in EEB. In the Azores case it appeared to give its
126. Article 11 provides that the NGO must (a) be an independent non-profitmaking lkgal person in accordance with a Member State's national law or practice, (b)
have the primary stated objective of promoting environmental protection in the
context of environmental law, (c) have existed for more than two years and be actively
pursuing the objective referred to under (b), and (d) have objectives and activities
which cover the subject matter of the request for internal review. See Aarhus
Regulation, supra note 8, art. 11, at 19.
127. Aarhus Regulation, supra note 8, art. 12(1), at 19. For a detailed analysis of
Articles 10 to 12 and a discussion of their drafting history going back to the
Commission's proposal (COM (2003) 622), see Marc Pallemaerts, Access to
EnvironmentalJustice at EU Level. Has the Aarhus Regulation' Improved the Situation in
THL AAR-HUS CONVENTION AT TLN 271, 287 (Marc Pallemaerts ed., 2011).
128. European Environmental Bureau (EElB) v. Commission, joined Cases T236/04 & T-241/04, [2005] E.C.R. II-4945. 1 71.
129. Opinion 1/09 delivered pursuant to artidce 218(11) TFEU, [2011] E.C.R. 11 137, 75 (discussing the creation of a unified patent ligation system).
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blessing to Articles 10 to 12.,1o More recently, in Stichting-Natuur
en Mfilieu 1 and Vereniging Milieudefensil 2 it held even Article 10
of the Aarhus Regulation partially invalid for not going far
enough!
The facts of Stichting Natuur en JMilieu were that the two
applicant environmental NGOs asked the Commission, pursuant
to Aiticle 10 of the Aarhus Regulation, to conduct an internal
review of Commission Regulation 149/2008 which set out
maximum residue levels for a large number of pesticides. 3 3 In
Vereiging Milieudefensie, two other NGOs did likewise with
respect to a Commission Decision authorising the Netherlands
to postpone the deadline, in certain regions, for meeting certain
air purity standards laid down by Directive of the European
Parliament and the Council on ambient air quality and cleaner
air for Europe.' 1 In both cases, the Commission rejected the
requests for internal review as being inadmissible on the
grounds that the targeted acts were not acts of individual scope.
In their actions, the NGOs contested the Commission's position
on the latter point. In the alternative, they entered what
amounted to a plea of illegality under what is now Article 277
TFEU to the effect that, by restricting the internal review
procedure to acts of individual scope, the Union legislator was
in breach of Article 9(3) of the Convention.

130. Regiao auton6noa dos A(ores v. Council of the European Union, Case T37/04. [2008] E.C.R. II-00103 (noting that because the procedural conditions of
Articles 10 and 12 were "manifestly not satisfied in the present case, it is not for the
Court to substitute itself for the legislature and to accept, on the basis of the Aarhus
Convention, the admissibility of an action which does not Inect the conditions laid
down in Article 230 EC.").
131. Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. European Commission, Case T-338/08, [20121
E.C.R. I_(deliveredJune 14, 2012) (not yet reported).
132. Vereniging Milicudefensic v. Commission, Case T-396/09, [2012] E.C.R.
I_(deliveredJune 14, 2012).
133. StichtingNatuur en Milieu, [2012] E.C.R. 1,
1[ 3 (delivered June 14, 2012);
see Comnnission Regulation No 149/2008 on Establishing Annexes II, III and IV Setting
Maximum Residue Levels for Products Covered by Annex I thereto, 2008 0.]. L 58/ 1.
134. Vereniging Milieudefensic v. Commission, Case T-396/09, [2012] E.C.R. I
(not yet published) (delivered June 14 2012); see Council Directive 2008/50/EC on
Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe, 2008 0.]. L 152/ 1. The Commission
Decision in question was Decision C(2009) 2560 final, which was based on Articde 22 of
that Directive. Vereniging Milicudefensic, [2012] E.C.R. I_
1 3 (delivered June 14
2012).
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In both cases, the General Court dismissed the first plea,
but found for the NGOs on the second plea. As to the latter
issue, the Commission relied on the fact that, in the Slovakian
Bears case, the Court had found that that provision lacked the
requisite clarity and precision to be directly applicable.
However, leaving aside the question of direct applicability, the
General Court focused instead on the ruling in the Aakajima v.
Council, I which concerned the GATT Anti-Dumping Code. In
that case, the Court of Justice had held that, where the
Community had intended to implement a "particular
obligation" assumed under an international agreement, or
where the measure in effect incorporated particular provisions
of that agreement by reference, it would review the compatibility
of a measure with the agreement concerned. The General Court
found that the Aarhus Regulation was in breach of Article 9(3)
of the Convention, as the applicants had claimed.
Probably the epithet most appropriate to describe the
Aakajima case law, which has only ever been applied to the
GATT, is "nebulous." That is not least because the concept of a
"particular obligation" is shrouded in mystery. More
importantly, the result of these judgments is that Article 9(3) of
the Convention may be relied upon before the courts even
though that provision is not sufficiently clear or precise to be
directly applicable. That raises an acute problem of legal
certainty.
The Council and the Commission have therefore lodged
appeals against both judgments, while the Parliament has
3
6
appealed against the judgment in Vereniging Milieudefensie.1
Understandably, the three institutions' decisions to appeal
triggered criticism from the NGOs. 137 Nevertheless, it is
135. Nakajirna v. Council, Case C-69/89, [1991] E.C.R. I-02069, I[ 30-31. This
principle is quite separate froin direct applicability. See id. 1 28; see also EEC Seed
Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation v. Commission, Case 70/87, [1991] E.C.R. I1781.
19-21.
136. Council, Parlianent and Commission v. Vereniging Milieudefensic and
Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht, joined Cases C-401-03/12P (; Cases C404/12P and C-405/12P Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu and
another.
137. Two NG(Os, namely (i) ClientEarth and (ii) Justice and Environment even
lodged a request for internal review of the Comlnission's decision to appeal. ELROPEAN

COmiSSION, The Aarihus Convention, Requests for Internal Review, (Jan. 25, 2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhiis/requests.htm. Citing Reynolds Tobacco v.
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important to understand that the repercussions of these cases
extend far beyond environmental law since, if the Court of
Justice upholds the judgments of the Court below, the
circumstances in which provisions of agreements concluded by
the Union may be relied on in judicial proceedings will be
radically extended across the board.1
Finally, what is the scope of judicial review of a decision by
which the Union institution or body accepts the admissibility of
a request for an internal review and gives a negative response to
the NGO on the substance? Manifestly, the Court can only
consider the legality of that negative decision on the request for
an internal review, not the legality of the initial "administrative
act" which is the subject of the NGO's request, as the latter act
does not concern the NGO either directly or individually.' "
Consequently, the Court can be expected to focus primarily on
the reasoning set out in the negative decision.140
THE AARHUS COAIENTION COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE
This article would not be complete without a brief mention
of the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee. Article 15 of
the Convention provides for the establishment "on a consensual
Commission. Case C-131/03P, [2006] E.C.R. 1-7795, 1 58. the Commission replied that
that decision lacked "legally binding and external effects" within the meaning of
Artile 2(1) (g) of the Aarhus Regulation. Letter fron Luis Roicro Requena, DirectorGeneral, Legal Service, European Commission, to ClicntEarth (Jan 15, 2013), available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environrment/aarhus/pdf/requests/
17.Replylttetr.o.(licntEarth.Jan.201 3.pdf.
138. In addition, the Commission is appealing against the General Court's finding
in paragraph 651T of itsjudgment in StichtingNatuaren Wilieu that the Commission had
not acted in a lkgislative capacity within the incaning of Article 2(2) of the Convention
when it adoptcd Regulation 149/2008. See Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. European
Commission, Case T-338/08, [2012] E.C.R.
, 651T (delivered june 14, 2012) (not
yet reported).
139. Sadcleer & Poncelet, supra note 123. at 205; accord Pallernaerts, supra note
11 6, at 295-96.
140. The first case of this kind to coie before the General Court is Case Stichting
Natuar en Milieu v Commission, Case T-574/12. [2012] E.C.R. I
(filed Dec. 18,
2012) (case in progress) (sequel to Stichting Natuar en Wilieu, [2012] E.C.R. 1,
(delivered June 14, 2012)). Although the Commission and the Council lodged appeals,
those appeals did not have suspensive effect. Accordingly, the two applicant NGOs
renewed their request of 2008 that the Commission review their initial request for a
review of Commission Regulation 149/2008. On October 16, 2012, the Commission
replied that, having carried out an internal review, it saw no need to aincnd that

Regulation. In Case T-574/12, the NGOs are now contesting that reply.
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basis" of "optional arrangements of a non-confrontational, nonjudicial and consultative nature" for reviewing compliance with
the provisions of the Convention, which "may include the
option of considering communications from members of the
public on matters related to the Convention." In accordance
with Article 15, "members of the public" are entitled to lodge a
communication without having to show any particular
interest. 141 As is clear from Article 15, the Committee is not a
court of law and its proceedings are deemed to be consensual.
By the same token, its rules of procedure are far more flexible
than any rules which might be familiar to the judiciary, and the
procedure is marked by great informality.'14 The Committee is
composed essentially of experts on environmental law chosen
from among nationals of the Contracting Parties; several are
professors of environmental law.14 In themselves, findings of the
Committee are not binding but, once they are endorsed by the
Meeting of the Parties, they acquire some force.144
Eighty-three "communications" had been lodged since the
Committee began its work in 2004.145 Of these, five have been
141. As we noticed earlier, the "public" as defined in Artile 2(4) covers natural
and legal persons and N)GOs, but it is doubtful if this term extends to public
authorities. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In any case, Artile 16 read with
Annex 11 to the Convention provides for separate mechanisms for the Settlement of
disputes between Contracting Parties. For EU Member States to resort to those
mechanisms in disputes with one another would be a breach of Artidce 344 TFEU
insofar as the subject-inatCt
falls within the scope of the Union Treaties. See
Commission v. United Kingdom (MOX Plant), Case C-459/03, [2006] E.C.R. 1-4635.
142. To view these rules of procedure, see U.N., Econ. Comm'n for Europe, U.N.
Econ, and Soc. Council, Decision 1/7 on Review of Compliance Meeting of the Parties,
annex, U.N. Doc EC/MP.PP /2/Add.8 (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Decision 1/7],
available
at
http://ww.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/cnv/pp/d(octulents/opI/
ccenp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf. Meetings of the Committce are held at the Palais des Nations,
the UN's premises in Geneva.
143. The President of the Committee is Professor Jonas Ebbeson. Dean of the Law
Faculty of Stockholm University. For copies of the Curricula Vitae of the current
members, see Committ MWembers. U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Europe, (last visited Arp. 6,
2013), http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ccmibership.html.

144. See Decision 1/7, supra note 142, at Annex, AlL. 37 (additionally empowering
the Meeting of the Parties to "decide upon appropriate measures to bring about full
compliance with the Convention.."). Virtually all the Compliance ComnitteCs reports

have been endorsed unconditionally by the Meeting of the Parties.
145. To underscore the consensual nature of the proceedings, complaints are
termied "communications" and complainants are referred to somewhat quaintly as
"commiunicants"; similarly, the Contracting Party whose acts or omissions are the

subject of a communication is known as the "Party concerned." For an overview of its
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directed against acts or omissions of the Union. For the EU, the
most important by far is the communication lodged by
ClientEarth and others in which they claim that the rules on
locus standi in annulment actions for non-privileged litigants
were in breach of Article 9 of the Convention. 146 The latter
communication was lodged prior to the entry into force of the

Treaty of Lisbon. Even though that Treaty has liberalised the
rules on standing by introducing the fourth paragraph of Article
263 TFEU, it is not yet clear how far that reform goes.14 7
In response, the Commission, representing the Union,
relied inter alia on the fact that the General Court and the Court
of Justice are not by any means the only courts administering
decisions, see generally Jerry Jendroska. Recent Case-Law of the Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committe, 8 4 J. FOR EIR. & ENVTi PL AN. L. 375 (2011) and the
compendium EUROPEAN ECO FOU RM, CASE LAW OF THF AARHUS CONVENTION
COMPLIANCL COMMITTLL 2004-2011 (A. Andrusevych, T. Alge, C. Konrad, eds., 2d ed.),
at
http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/treaties/publicavailable
participation/ pu blicatins.hitml.
146

. Communication

fron

ClientEarth,

(ACCC/C/2008/32)

European

Community (Dec. 1, 2008). The others are: U.N. Economic Commission for Europe,
Compliance By The European Conmunity With Its Obligations Under The Convention,
ACCC/C/2005/17 (May 2, 2008) (finding that the Union had not breached the
Con ention when it financed a landfill in Lithuania); U.N. Economic Commission for
Europe, Finding with regard to communication ACCC/C/2007/21 concerning compliance by
the European Community,. A(((/(/2007/21 (Feb. 8. 2011) (financing of a power plant
by the European Investment Bank (an EU body) in Albania found not be in breach of
the Convention); U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Findingsand recommendations
with regard to communication ACCC/C/2010/54 concerning compliance by the European
Union, ACCC/C/2010/54 (Oct. 10, 2012) (holding that the Union breached the
Convention by failing to ensure that Ireland, which had not yet ratified the
Convention, acted in accordance with that instrument when iniplenenting Union
legislation on renewable energy; that decision of the Committee has yet to be endorsed
by the meeting of the parties); Communication fromt Avich & Kilchrenan Community
Council to Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, ACCC/C/2012/68 (Feb. 12.
2012) (not yet decided) (this communication, which is directed against the United
Kingdom as well as against the EU. also concerns renewable enertgy).
147. Another clement of uncertainty concerned the scope and standard of
judicial review of decisions taken pursuant to Article 10 of the Aarhus Regulation. At
the time, the proceedings in StichtingNatuur en Milieu and Pesticide Action Network Europe
v. European Commission (Case T-338/08, [2012] E.C.R. I,
(delivered June 14, 2012)
(not yet reported)) and Vereniging Wiliendefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging
Utrecht v. European Commission (Case T-396/09. [2012] E.C.R. I
(delivered June 14
2012) (not yet reported)) were still pending before the General Court. Accordingly,
the Commission asked that proceedings on ClientEarth's communication be
suspended on the grounds that the matter was sub judice. The Compliance Committee
decided to proceed with the case, while lcaving aside the aspects rclating to the internal
review procedure under the Aarhus Regulation.
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Union law, since the courts of the Member States are the
"'ordinary' courts within the European Union legal order"
whose task is to "implement European Union law . . . ."148 The
Commission also pointed out that, even if the Committee found
against the Union, the latter would be in no position to
implement the Committee's findings without amending Article
263 TFEU itself, which would be a Herculean task.149
On April 14, 2011, the Committee concluded its
deliberations on ClientEarth's communication. Its key finding
reads: "While the Committee is not convinced that the Party
concerned [i.e. the Union] fails to comply with the Convention,
given the evidence before it, it considers that a new direction of
the jurisprudence of the EU Courts should be established in
order to ensure compliance with the Convention."1 5 s Since these
findings have yet to be endorsed by the Meeting of the Parties,
they have no legal force.
CONCL USION
The Aarhus Convention has brought novel solutions to
governance issues, notably by conferring special powers on
NGOs. To what extent it will be a source of inspiration outside
148. Opinion 1/09, [2011] E.C.R. I-1137 1[ 80 (delivered pursuant to Artice
218(11) TFELU) (regarding the creation of a unilied patent ligation system).
149. Pallemacrts has suggested that there is no need to anend the Treaty, since it
would suffice to use the kgal basis of Artice 257 TFEU, which provides for the
establishment of specialised courts. See Pallemaerts, supra note i16, at 312. Yet it is not
at all obvious how this provision could be used to confer jurisdiction on a specialized
court over matters for which the Court of Justice itself enjoys no jurisdiction under the
Treaty. Rather, the purpose of Article 257 must be to empower the Union legislator to
carve out certain matters currently failing under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
(in reality the General Court) and confer them on a specialized court, as has alircady
occurred wvith the Staff Tribunal.
150. Findings & Recommendations of the Compliance Committee with Regard to
Communication A((((/2008/32 (Part I) Concerning Compliance by the European
Union, [ 97 (Apr. 14, 2011). The Committee is nothing if not transparent: all the
communications and correspondence
relating to them are available on
Communications

from

the

Public,

U.N.

ECON.

COMM'N

FOR

EUROPL,

http://www unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). The
Commission has objected to these findings on procedural grounds. See generally ktter
from Jcan-Frangois Brakeland. Director. Compliance Promotion. Governance & Legal
Issues, Legal Affairs & Cohesion, Directorate General Environment, European
Conission, to Aphrodite Snagadi, Secretary to the Aarhus Convention, Compliance
Comnittce, Environment Division (July 20, 2011), available at hItp://wwwutece.org/
fileadminL/)AM/env/pp/compliance/(2008-32/correspondence/frParty20.07.11 .pdf
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the environmental field remains to be seen. In any event, what is
clear beyond doubt is that the Court of Justice has played a key
role in the interpretation of the Convention and that its case law
on the Convention can be expected to have a major impact
beyond the confines of Union. What is equally plain is that this
is still work in progress: many crucial issues still need to be
clarified.

